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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER KENT BINGHAM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890149-CA 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1987-
88. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Third Degree Felony, 
Theft by Receiving, in violation of Section 76-6-408 and 412, 
Utah Criminal Code, as amended. Defendant entered a plea of not 
guilty to the Information and was found guilty by a jury on the 
25th day of August, 1987. Sentence was pronounced nunc pro tunc 
on the 15th day of February, 1989, effective the 18th day of 
September, 1987. Notice of Appeal was filed on or about the 9th 
day of March, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE SUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THEFT BY RECEIVING WHERE THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT THE PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF THE 
DEFENDANT HAD BEEN STOLEN. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-4-408 and Section 76-4-412. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about the 17th day of January of 1987, a law 
enforcement officer was on patrol in Utah County when he observed 
a vehicle commit a traffic offense. The officer followed the 
vehicle west bound and clocked a speed running is excess of the 
posted speed limit. The officer put his overhead lights on and 
stopped the vehicle approximately one mile from where he had 
initially signaled by use of his overhead lights. As he 
approached the vehicle, he noticed two people in the vehicle and 
observed what he perceived to be suspicious movements by the 
passenger and driver of the vehicle. Upon approaching the 
vehicle, the officer could see several cartons of cigarettes in 
the vehicle. Upon a subsequent search of the vehicle in keeping 
with the inventory policy of the County Sheriff's Office, the 
officer found approximately thirty (30) cartons of cigarettes. 
(T.R. 20-30) 
The State called an individual named Bob Tulin who indicated 
he was the supervisor for Southland Corporation 7-Eleven Stores 
who testified that each of the 7-Eleven stores was assigned a 
five-digit number which are stamped on each carton of cigarettes 
delivered to the store by the parent corporation. Mr. Tulin 
further testified that thirty (30) cartons of cigarettes had 
numbers stamped on them which could be so identified, and 
identified the thirty (30) cartons as having been delivered to 
five (5) different 7-Eleven stores, one (1) in Pleasant Grove, 
three (3) in Orem, and one (1) in Springville. (T.R. 46-50) 
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In addition to the officers involved in the stop and search 
of the vehicle, and the representative of the Southland 
Corporation head office, Mr. Tulin, the State called one 
additional witness. Lyndalee Pratter testified that she was the 
owner of the vehicle, that the Defendant has borrowed her vehicle 
and that at the time he borrowed the vehicle from the witness 
there were not any cartons of cigarettes in the vehicle. There 
was no testimony presented at all that the cartons of cigarettes 
were, in fact, stolen. There was no testimony concerning any 
reports of stolen property or any property missing from 
inventories of any of the stores identified as being the stores 
to whom the cartons of cigarettes found in Defendant's vehicle 
were delivered. 
At the conclusion of the State fs case, counsel for the 
Defendant moved for a dismissal of the Information on the basis 
that there was insufficient evidence presented by the State upon 
which the jury could determine that the property had been stolen. 
(T.R. 56) The Court denied Defendant's motion and required the 
case to proceed. (T.R. 59-60) Counsel for Defendant then 
arrested without presenting any additional evidence and the 
matter was submitted to the jury with the result that the 
Defendant was found guilty by the jury of the offense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The motion of the Defendant to dismiss at the conclusion of 
the State's case for failure of the State to introduce sufficient 
evidence upon which the jury could find that a theft had been 
3 
committed should have been granted, and further, there was 
insufficient evidence upon which the jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a theft had been committed. 
POINT I 
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE 
UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY RECEIVING 
The elements of the crime of theft by receiving are set 
forth in the case of State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (1987). Under 
the Ramon decision, the following elements must be present: 
1. Property belonging to another has been stolen; 
2. The defendant received, retained or disposed of the 
stolen property; 
3. At the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the 
property, the defendant knew or believed the property was 
stolen; and 
4. Defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of 
possession of the property. 
In the present case, the Defendant submits that the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could 
properly find and base a finding of guilt as to two of the 
foregoing elements. First, there was no evidence that property 
belonging to another had been stolen. The only witness called to 
identify the ownership of the property was Mr. Tulin from the 
Southland Corporation who could only testify that thirty (30) of 
the cartons of cigarettes found in possession of the Defendant 
had been distributed at some unspecified time to five (5) 
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different 7-Eleven stores in the Utah County area. There is no 
testimony as to when that distribution was made, no testimony 
that any of the stores to whom the deliveries of cigarettes were 
made had claimed any loss or was missing any of the property from 
its inventory. Additionally, the only evidence of any 
identification on the cigarettes which would distinguish them as 
belonging to the 7-Eleven stores was a five-digit number known 
only to the employees of the Southland Corporation. 
Further, the element number three provides that the 
defendant at the time of receiving must have known or believed 
that the property was stolen. There is no evidence that 
Defendant had or should have possessed such knowledge as the mere 
presence of the cartons of cigarettes in the vehicle would not 
give rise to any indication that they belonged to anyone else 
and, in fact, there was no testimony that they were not 
legitimately purchased and were the subject of theft. 
State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026 (1982) cites the case of State 
v. Hall. 105 Utah 162, 145 P. 2d 494, for the proposition that 
goods found in defendant's possession must be identified as the 
goods which are charged to have been stolen. State v. Franks. 
649 P. 2d 3 (1982) indicates that the burden is upon the State to 
show unauthorized control, not upon the defendant to show 
authorized control. At the time of the motion to dismiss on the 
part of the Defendant for failure of the State to prove the 
allegations of the Information, there was not sufficient evidence 
in the record upon which the jurors could find that the elements 
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as set forth above were present. The State at that point had not 
even demonstrated a prima facia case of theft since two of the 
essential elements were lacking. 
Further, after this Court has previously stated in the case 
of State v. Lactod, 90 Ut. Adv. Rep. 46, as follows: 
We review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
Facts of this case are not in dispute or refuted in the 
evidence. A jury is instructed that they must find all of the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Two of those elements are as 
set forth above, to wit: that the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the property of 7-Eleven stores and that at the time 
he did so, it was done with knowledge that the property was 
stolen or believing it probably had been stolen. (Jury 
Instruction No. 5) The record contains no evidence to 
demonstrate either of those two elements were present upon which 
a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of the 
two aforementioned elements. Without evidence of both of those 
elements, the conviction of the Defendant cannot be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have granted Defendants motion to 
dismiss for lack of evidence that the property in the possession 
of the Defendant was stolen and that, at the time he was 
possession of said property, the Defendant knew or should have 
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known that it was stolen. Any evidence from which inferences 
might be drawn to suggest or infer those elements is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that fact and the 
conviction of a jury based on such evidence should be reversed. 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction upon the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $ £ ^day of July, 1989. 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies 
of the foregoing Appellate Brief to Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, Utah 
Attorney General, at 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
this ?P5~~ day of July, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
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76-6-407 CRIMINAL CODE 100 
reer, financial condition, reputation, or personal 
relationships. 1973 
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly 
delivered property. 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another which he 
knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have 
been delivered under a mistake as to the identity 
of the recipient or as to the nature or amount of 
the property, without taking reasonable mea-
sures to return it to the owner; and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of 
the property when he obtains the property or at 
any time prior to taking the measures designated 
in paragraph (1). 1973 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of 
pawnbrokers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, 
or disposes of the property of another knowing that it 
has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids 
in concealing, selling, or withholding any such prop-
erty from the owner, knowing the property to be sto-
len, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph 
(1) is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of other 
property stolen on a separate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property within 
the year preceding the receiving offense charged; 
or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort re-
ceived, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a 
consideration which he knows is far below its 
reasonable value. 
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or oper-
ates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or 
an agent, employee or representative of the 
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or ob-
tains property and fails to require the seller or 
person delivering the property to certify, in writ-
ing, that he has the legal rights to sell the prop-
erty. If the value given for the property, exceeds 
$20 the pawnbroker or person shall also require 
the seller or person delivering the property to 
obtain a legible print, preferably the right 
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to his 
signature and at least one other positive form of 
identification. 
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has 
or operates a business dealing in or collect-
ing used or secondhand merchandise or per-
sonal property, and every agent, employee or 
representative of the pawnbroker or person 
who fails to comply with the requirements of 
(d) shall be presumed to have bought, re-
ceived or obtained the property knowing it to 
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. 
This presumption may be rebutted by proof 
(ii) When in a prosecution under this sec-
tion it appears from the evidence that the 
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who 
has or operates a business dealing in or col-
lecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, or was an agent, em-
ployee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, 
concealed or withheld the property without 
requiring the person from whom he bought, 
received, or obtained the property to sign the 
certificate required in paragraph (d) and in 
the event the transaction involves an 
amount exceeding $20 also place his legible 
print, preferably the right thumb, on the cer-
tificate, then the burden shall be upon the 
defendant to show that the property bought, 
received or obtained was not stolen. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, 
control, or title or lending on the security of the 
property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of 
buying or selling goods. 1979 
76-6-409. Theft of services. 
( 1 ) A person commits theft if he obtains services 
which he knows are available only for compensation 
by deception, threat, force, or any other means de-
signed to avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over 
the disposition of services of another, to which he 
knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his 
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows 
is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section, "services" includes, but is not 
limited to, labor, professional service, public utility 
and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, 
tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommoda-
tions, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or 
trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph ser-
vice, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, 
sporting events, or other events for which a charge is 
made. 
(4) Under this section, "services" includes gas, 
electricity, water, or sewer, only if the services are 
obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not 
described in Section 76-6-409.3. 1967 
76-6*409.1. Devices for theft of services — Sei-
zure and destruction — Civil actions 
for damage*. 
( D A person may not knowingly: 
(a) make or possess any instrument, appara-
tus, equipment, or device for the use of, or for the 
purpose of, committing or attempting to commit 
theft under Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or 
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, 
or otherwise transfer to another any information, 
instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or 
any information, plan, or instruction for obtain-
ing, making, or assembling the same, with intent 
that it be used, or caused to be used, to commit or 
attempt to commit theft under Section 76-6-409 
or 76-6-409.3. 
.(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus, 
equipment, or device, or information, plan, or in-
struction referred to in Subsection (1) may be 
seized pursuant to a court order, lawful search 
and seizure, lawful arrest, or other lawful pro-
cess. 
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a vio-
lation of any provision of this section, any infor-
mation, instrument, apparatus, equipment, de-
vice, plan, or instruction shall be destroyed as 
contraband by the sheriff of the county in which 
the person was convicted. 
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsec-
tion (1) or (2) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not 
affect any person's right of civil action for redress for 
101 CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-412 
damages suffered as a result of any violation of this 
section. 1M7 
76-6-409.3. Theft of utility services. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint 
owner, tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant 
by the entirety of the whole or a part of any 
building and the property on which it is located. 
(b) "Person" means any individual, firm, part-
nership, corporation, company, association, or 
other legal entity. 
(c) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person, 
including the owner, who occupies the whole or 
part of any building, whether alone or with 
others. 
(d) "Utility" means any public utility, munici-
pally-owned utility, or cooperative utility which 
provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any 
combination of them, for sale to consumers. 
(2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility service if 
he commits any of the following acts which make gas, 
electricity, water, or sewer available to a tenant or 
occupant, including himself, without the payment of 
full compensation to the utility. Any person aiding 
and abetting in these prohibited acts is a principal 
and is so punishable. Prohibited acts include: 
(a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, or other 
instrument with any meter, device, or other in-
strument used for conducting gas, electricity, 
water, or sewer in a manner as permits the use of 
the gas, electricity, water, or sewer without its 
passing through a meter or other instrument re-
cording the usage for billing; 
(b) altering, injuring, or preventing the nor-
mal action of a meter, valve, stopcock, or other 
instrument used for measuring quantities of gas, 
electricity, water, or sewer service; 
(c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, or 
sewer connections or otherwise restoring service 
when one or more of those utilities have been 
lawfully disconnected or turned off by the pro-
vider of the utility service; 
(d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or caus-
ing to be broken or defaced any seal, locking de-
vice, or other part of a metering device for record-
ing usage of gas, electricity, water, or sewer ser-
vice, or a security system for the recording de-
vice; 
(e) removing a metering device designed to 
measure quantities of gas, electricity, water, or 
sewer service; 
(f) transferring from one location to another a 
metering device for measuring quantities of pub-
lic utility services of gas, electricity, water, or 
sewer service; 
(g) changing the indicated consumption, jam-
ming the measuring device, bypassing the meter 
or measuring device with a jumper so that it does 
not indicate use or registers use incorrectly, or 
otherwise obtaining quantities of gas, electricity, 
water, or sewer service from the utility without 
their passing through a metering device for mea-
suring quantities of consumption for billing pur-
poses; 
(h) using a metering device belonging to the 
utility that has not been assigned to the location 
and installed by the utility; or 
(i) fabricating or using a device to pick or oth-
erwise tamper with the locks used to deter utility 
service diversion, meter tampering, and meter 
(3) The presence on property in the possession of a 
person of any device or alteration which permits the 
diversion or use of utility service to avoid the regis-
tration of the use by or on a meter installed by the 
utility or to otherwise avoid the recording of use of 
the service for payment gives rise to a presumption 
that the person in possession of the property installed 
the device or caused the alteration if: 
(a) the presence of the device or alteration can 
be attributed only to a deliberate act in further-
ance of an intent to avoid payment for utility 
service; and 
(b) the person charged has received the direct 
benefit of the reduction of the cost of the utility 
service. 
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of 
the offense of theft of utility service. If the value of 
the gas, electricity, water, or sewer service is: 
(a) up to $250, the offense is a class A misde-
meanor; 
(b) greater than $250 but not more titan 
$1,000, the offense is a third degree felony; 
(c) greater than $1,000, or if the offender has 
previously been convicted of a violation of this 
section, the offense is a second degree felony. 
(5) A person who violates this section shall make 
restitution to the utility for the value of the gas, elec-
tricity, water, or sewer service consumed in violation 
of this section plus all reasonable expenses and costs 
incurred on account of the violation of this section. 
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and 
costs for investigation, disconnection, reconnection, 
service calls, employee time, and equipment use. 
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does 
not affect the right of a utility to bring a civil action 
for redness for damages suffered as a result of the 
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this sec-
tion. 
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other 
right, action, or remedy otherwise available to a util-
ity. 19S7 
76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of 
property pursuant to repair or rental 
agreement. 
(1) A person is guilty of thefl if: 
(a) Having custody of property pursuant to an 
agreement between himself or another and the 
owner thereof whereby the actor or another is to 
perform for compensation a specific service for 
the owner involving the maintenance, repair, or 
use of such property, he intentionally uses or op-
erates it, without the consent of the owner, for 
his own purposes in a manner constituting a 
gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or 
(b) Having custody of any property pursuant 
to a rental or lease agreement where it is to be 
returned in a specified manner or at a specified 
time, intentionally fails to comply with the terms 
of the agreement concerning return so as to ren-
der such failure a gross deviation from the agree-
ment, ltra 
76-6-411. Repealed. if74 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — 
Action for treble damages against re-
ceiver of stolen property. 
(1) Thefl of property and services as provided in 
this chapter shall be punishable as follows 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services 
exceeds $1,000; or 
76-6-601 CRIMINAL CODE 102 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly 
weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person 
of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is 
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before con-
victed of theft of property or services valued 
at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, 
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, 
bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, 
swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was more than $100 but does 
not exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was $100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation 
of Subsection (1), of Section 76-6-408 may bring an 
action against any person mentioned in (d) for three 
times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained 
by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attor-
neys' fe08. 1*77 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
Section 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device for 
writing. 
76-6-503. Fraudulent handling of recordable writ-
ings. 
76-6-504. Tampering with records. 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presump-
tion. 
76-6-506. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Definitions. 
76-6-506.1. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Falsely making, coding or signing 
card — Falsely signing evidence of 
card transaction. 
76-6-506.2. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Unlawful use of card or automated 
banking device — False application 
for card. 
76-6-506.3. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Unlawful acquisition, possession or 
transfer of card. 
76-6-506.4. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Property obtained by unlawful con-
duct. 
76-6-506.5. Financial transaction card offenses — 
Classification. 
76-6-507. Deceptive business practices — Defini-
tions — Defense. 
76-6-508. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person 
in the business of selection, appraisal, 
or criticism of goods or services 
76-6-509. Bribery of a labor official. 
76-6-510. Bribe receiving by a labor official. 
76-6-511. Defrauding creditors. 
76-6-512. Acceptance of deposit by insolvent finan-
cial institution. 
76-6-513. Unlawful dealing with property by fidu-
ciary. 
Section 
76-6-515. Using or making slugs. 
76-6-516. Conveyance of real estate by married 
man without wife's consent. 
76-6-517. Making a false credit report. 
76-6-518. Criminal simulation. 
76-6-519. Repealed. 
76-6-520. Criminal usury. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance claim — 
Punishment as for theft. 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
( 1 ) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facili-
tating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing 
so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transfer-
ence, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at 
a time or place or in a numbered sequence other 
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes print-
ing or any other method of recording information, 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other in-
strument or writing issued by a government, or 
any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or 
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other in-
strument or writing representing an interest in 
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the 
writing is or purports to be a check with a face 
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class 
A misdemeanor. i*7& 
76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device 
for writing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly 
possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in 
Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud know-
ingly possesses any device for making any such writ-
ing, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, except 
where the altering, making, completion, execution, 
issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such 
writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in 
which event the possession of the writing or device for 
making such a writing shall constitute a class A mis-
demeanor. 1974 
76-6-503. Fraudulent handling of recordable 
writings. 
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure 
anyone falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any 
will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or other 
writing for which the law provides public recording is 
guilty of fraudulent handling of recordable writings. 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a 
felony of the third degree. 1S7S 
76-6-504. Tampering with records. 
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(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Xa) 
through (i). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. itss 
78-2-3. Repealed. ltftt 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, Judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. ISM 
78-2-5. Repealed. itss 
78*2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necesssiry for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Count of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
isst 
78-2-7. Repealed. its* 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the stale. lass 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. isss.isss 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. IMS 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees.. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and pireside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. itss 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary wiits involving a criminal convic-
tion, except those involving a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
